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CONSUMER NEWS
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S SECTION 2
REPORT SPARKS A HEATED DEBATE
IN THE ANTITRUST COMMUNITY
Dawn Goulet*

On September 8, 20o8, the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ"), after a year-long collaboration with the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") to study antitrust enforcement under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, unilaterally issued a report setting
forth the agency's policy guidance on the subject.1 That report
has now been roundly criticized by a majority of FTC
commissioners, drawing sharp attention to the two very different
faces of U.S. antitrust law enforcement policy.2 The report has
also sparked a heated debate among antitrust policymakers and
J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.

I

U.S.

DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY : SINGLE-FIRM

CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (Sept. 8, 2oo8), available

at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/single firm/sfchearing.htm
[hereinafter DOJ REPORT] ("Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits a firm
from illegally acquiring or maintaining a monopoly, meaning the ability to
exclude competitors and profitably raise price significantly above competitive
levels for a sustained period of time. Unlike antitrust laws that prohibit
anticompetitive mergers or other agreements among firms, Section 2
particularly targets single-firm conduct, such as decisions regarding whether
and on what terms to sell to or buy from others. Although possessing
monopoly power is not unlawful, using an improper means to seek or maintain
monopoly power is unlawful where it can harm competition and consumers.").
2 Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the
Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo8/o9/o8o9o8section2stmt.pdf [hereinafter
Statement of FTC Commissioners].
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academics, leaving many wondering what affect, if any, the
report will have on the future of antitrust enforcement.
THE YEARLONG INTRA-AGENCY STUDY

In June 2006 the DOJ and FTC began a year-long series of
public hearings to study issues related to enforcement of Section 2
of the Sherman Act.' The hearings, comprised of 29 separate
panels of over ioo participants, took place over I9 days.4
Discussions at the hearings covered a broad range of topics,
including specific types of single-firm conduct like predatory
pricing, bundling, tying, and refusals to deal. I The study was
meant to culminate in the release of a joint report "draw[ing] on
the rich body of commentary created during the hearings, judicial
'6
precedent, and scholarly research.
THE

DOJ ISSUES ITS REPORT

What began as a joint undertaking, however, has ended
with the DOJ alone issuing its 213-page report, titled
"Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act."7 The document purports to
"identif[y] and discuss a number of areas of consensus with
8
It
respect to the proper treatment of single-firm conduct.
confirms a rebuttable presumption of monopoly power "[w]hen a
firm has maintained a market share in excess of two-thirds for a
significant period and its market position would not likely be
eroded in the near future."9
Additionally, though it admits no single test for
anticompetitive conduct works well in all cases, the DOJ's report
"encourages the continuing development of conduct-specific tests
and safe harbors."'
This comports with the report's apparent
primary goal of setting forth "standards that are more clear and
administrable," as the DOJ believes that "[v]ague or overly
' Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2oo8), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2oo8/236975.htm
[hereinafter
DOJ Press Release].
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 DOJ REPORT, supra note i.
' DOJ Press Release, supra note 3.
9 Id.
10Id.
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inclusive prohibitions against single-firm conduct are particularly
likely to undermine economic growth and to harm consumers.""
Many of the more specific findings of the report likewise
confirm the agency's preoccupation with the potential harm or
"chilling effect" on investment and innovation that can be caused
when antitrust law results in over-enforcement or the creation of
"false positives." For example, the report makes the following
conclusions:
The historical hostility of the law to the practice of tying is
unjustified, and the qualified rule of per se illegality applicable to
tying is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's modern
antitrust decisions and should be abandoned;
Bundling discounting
frequently benefits consumers.

[is

a]

common

practice

that

.

Antitrust liability for mere unilateral, unconditional
refusals to deal with rivals should not play a meaningful role in
Section 2 enforcement...;
Exclusive-dealing arrangements foreclosing less than 30
percent of existing customers or effective distribution should not
be illegal; and
Remedies for conduct that is found to violate Section 2
should re-establish the opportunity for competition without
unnecessarily chilling competitive practices or undermining
12
incentive to invest and innovate.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSIONERS RESPOND

The very same day the Section 2 report was released, all
four current FTC Commissioners (one seat is vacant) issued
statements. A bipartisan majority of FTC commissioners quickly
and unequivocally distanced themselves from the report in a
statement of harsh disapproval. 3Commissioners Pamela Harbour
(I), Jon Leibowitz (D), and Thomas Rosch (R) roundly denounced
the report as "a blueprint for radically weakened enforcement of
" Id.
12

Id.

"3 Statement of

FTC Commissioners, supra note 2, at i.
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Section 2" that "goes beyond the holdings of the Supreme Court
cases upon which it relies" and "seriously overstates the level of
legal, economic, and academic consensus regarding Section 2.14
. The Commissioners aditionally fault the DOJ for creating
broad safe harbors for dominant firms and "impos[ing] rigorous
burdens of proof on both public and private plaintiffs" outside of
those safe harbors that "will be difficult, if not impossible, for
plaintiffs to meet." "s They conclude that the report "erects a
multi-layered protective screen for firms with monopoly or nearmonopoly power," behind which "dominant firms would be able
to engage in [anticompetitive] practices with impunity, regardless
of potential foreclosure effects and impact on consumers."' 6
The Commissioners' statement points to four fundamental
premises they believe the DOJ's report is based upon: i) "the
theory that the promise of monopoly profits drives firms to
innovate and compete," 2) "the risk of over-enforcement of
Section 2 is greater than the risk of under-enforcement," 3) "'costs
of administration' [are] a factor weighing against enforcement of
Section 2," and 4) there is a strong "need for clear and
administrable rules [and] this need has motivated courts to
fashion 'bright line' tests." 7 Admitting that the "premises are not
totally lacking in support from some of the witnesses at the
Section 2 hearings, Supreme Court dicta in some cases, and
additional scholarship," the Commissioners nevertheless strongly
disagree that the premises "represent the consensus, or even the
prevailing[] views of the section 2 stakeholders." 18
For instance, they i) feel that the report downplays the
risks of under-enforcement or "false-negatives,"' 9 2) argue that the
DOJ's disproportionality test, requiring anticompetitive effects to
be "disproportionally" greater than procompetitive potential
distorts the rule of reason standard, which has long held that a
mere outweighing will suffice, 20 and 3) are wary of the DOJ's
reliance on economic theory. 2' Their statement notes that "the
recent warning of Justice Breyer bears repeating: while economic
theory is an important consideration in applying antitrust law,
14

Id.

15

Id. at io.

16

Id.

17Id. at 2-4.

'sId.at 4.
19

Statement of FTC Commissioners, supra note 2 at 3.

20

Id. at 5.

21

Id. at

1-2.
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economic theory is not tantamount to the law itself. 22
Chairman William Kovacic (R) chose to issue his own
statement, neither endorsing nor opposing the report, but
lamenting the fact that the agencies' joint deliberations had not
resulted in a single document reflecting their common views.3
Chairman Kovacic's statement indicates he finds the report to be
lacking in historical context: "an appreciation for [historical
enforcement] trends ought to inspire caution before one embraces
the proposition that U.S. antitrust doctrine and policy today
expose dominant firms to significant, systematic risks attributable
to over-inclusive liability rules." 24 This seems to read as an
admonition that the DOJ's fear of false positive over-enforcement
is unfounded.
Kovacic points to what he calls the "double helix" of two
intertwining schools of thought, the Chicago School and the
Harvard School, as the source of modern "presumptions and
precautions that disfavor intervention by U.S. courts and
enforcement agencies." 25 He concludes that if these "judicial
perceptions of overreaching by private suits are narrowing the
zone of substantive liability, public agencies eventually may be
unable to do their job." 26 In essence, Chairman Kovacic's
primary concern is that burdens imposed on private litigants will
be carried by public agencies trying to prosecute cases, hinting
that the DOJ may be writing itself out of a job by seeking to erect
such barriers.2 7
DOES THE

DOJ's POSITION FAVOR BIG BUSINESS?

Many critics agree with Commissioners Harbour,
Leibowitz and Rosch that the DOJ's report "prescribes a legal
regime that places [the] interests [of firms that enjoy monopoly or
near monopoly power] ahead of the interests of consumers."2' , A
22 Id.

23 Statement

of Federal Trade Commission Chairman William E. Kovacic,
Modern U.S. Competition Law and the Treatment of Dominant Firms:
Comments on the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Proceedings Relating to Section 2 of the Sherman Act i (Sept. 8, 2008),
available

at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo8/o9/o8o9o8section2stmtkovacic.pdf

[hereinafter Statement of Chairman Kovacic].
25

Id. at 2, 4-5.
Id. at 5,.7.

26

Id. at 8.

24

27 Id.
28

Statement of FTC Commissioners, supra note

2,

at i.
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New York Times editorial recently minced no words when it
called the Report "a deregulatory gift aimed at getting pesky
antitrust enforcers off the back of big business."2 9 The aritcle
criticized the suggested standard that proof of harm to
competition be "disproportionately" greater than the potential
new doctrine bends over
gains to consumers, saying "[t]he
30
firms.
big
protect
to
backward
Although the DOJ's report reassures readers that Section 312
will "continue to be a key component of antitrust enforcement,"
critics emphasize the agency's record of inaction in this arena,
pointing out that "[t]hroughout the entire Bush administration,
[the DOJ] has not brought a single case against a dominant firm
for anticompetitive behavior," but has instead "argued
enthusiastically on behalf of monopolists before the Supreme
The DOJ's "hands-off stance" has been called
Court. '32
"conspicuous and troubling," especially in the wake of the
agency's recent decision not to challenge the Whirlpool-Maytag
merger and its permissive settlement of the monopolization case
against Microsoft. 3 Senator Herb Kohl (D-Wis.), chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee's antitrust subcommittee said the
DOJ's report is "an assault on the Sherman Act," and represents
and anti-consumer decision by this
just "another anti-competition
'' 4
Division.
Antitrust
In stark contrast is the FTC, which has remained active in
Section 2 enforcement during the Bush administration, some
claim because its five commissioners hold staggered terms and
must vary in their party affiliations. 3 FTC Chairman Kovacic
has whimsically described the relationship between the two
agencies as "an archipelago of policy makers with very
inadequate ferry service between the islands," noting that in "too
many instances when you go to visit those islands the inhabitants
36
come out with sticks and torches and try to chase you away."
9Another Thumb on the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. I, 2008, at A22.
30Id.

DOJ REPORT, supra note i.
Thumb on the Scales, supra note 30.
33Jonathan B. Baker, Turning on Itself. How Dueling Agencies in the
Bush Administration Made Mincemeat of Antitrust Regulation Policy, THE
NEW REPUBIIC, Sept. 15, 2008, available at http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.
31
31

html?id=97981a77-c668-42 Ib-947a-a8282ca3bl2 I.

3"Peter Whoriskey, Justice's Monopoly Guidelines Assailed, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 2008, at Doi.
35 Id.

36

FTC Commissioner Claims DOJ Attorneys Chase Him Away With
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Assistant Attorney General Tomas 0. Barnett (before his
resignation, effective November 19, 2008) defended the DOJ's
report as being "pro-consumer. "'3
Though he agreed that
prohibiting bad behavior by monopolists is important, Barnett
also stressed the need "to avoid interfering in the rough and
tumble of beneficial competition that drives innovation and

economic growth. "38
Despite appraisals to the contrary by the majority of FTC
commissioners, Barnett has claimed the report is "consistent with
the overall framework that has been endorsed by courts and
scholars. '39 In a statement reacting to public commentary after
the report, was issued, however, Barnett stated that the document
was "meant. to contribute to the public debate.., not to resolve
all areas of debate for all time." 40 He admitted that "[t]he
majority of the report's conclusions were not based on the weight
of the panelists' testimony, or even on the additional scholarly
commentary cited in the report, but on judicial precedent,
including recent Supreme Court case law."' Barnett concluded
his statement by defending the DOJ's primary goal in issuing the
report: to set clear, articulable standards for Section 2
enforcement. He argued that "[a]bandoning objective standards
in an effort to preserve the ability to pursue every theoretically
conceivable harm is counterproductive."42
CRITICS CLAIM MISSES OPPORTUNITIES

Some critics decry the interagency "rift between FTC's
traditionalists and [the DOJ]'s non-interventionists," claiming it
has "made mincemeat of antitrust regulation policy" in the U.S. 43
Indeed, it is an understatement to say that "it is an unwelcome
surprise when the federal antitrust enforcement agencies can't
Torches, http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/83i

(Feb. i,

2007, 4:42

EST).
3 Whoriskey, supra note 34.
38 Id. (citing DOJ Press Release, supra note 3).
3 Whoriskey, supra note 34.
40 Thomas 0 Barnett and Hill B. Wellford, GLOBAL COMPETITION
POLICY, The DOJ's Single-Firm Conduct Report: Promoting Consumer
Welfare Through Clearer Standards for Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Oct.

2oo8,

at

8,

http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php ?id= 14 13

&action=907.
41 Id. at i i.
41

Id.

"

Baker, supra note 33.

at 15.
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agree on the law," given that these two agencies have been
granted overlapping enforcement authority and have often
44
collaborated in setting antitrust policy in the past.
Others point out "the missed opportunity of the report to
study, and take seriously, the substantive law.., in the many
jurisdictions outside the United States."4' 5 Although a number of
witnesses from outside the U.S. participated in the hearings, the
report includes.few references to foreign law;46 this when foreign
law is increasingly taking a different approach from the U.S. For
example, the European Commission's competition policies have
resulted in more unilateral conduct cases brought in Europe, in
part because, as Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for
Competition Policy has stated, the U.S. is more concerned "about
over-enforcement, about false posititives, than in Europe,"
whereas "[i]n Europe, [enforcers] are worried equally about overenforcement and under-enforcement" because "[b]oth false
positives and false negatives harm consumers."4' 7
The European Commission has recently concluded its own
study of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, issuing a draft
report titled "Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings," on
December 3, 2008.48 In it the EC formally adopts the "effectsbased" approach it has already applied in enforcement actions
like the one against Microsoft.4 9 Though the EC claims "the
14 The FTC and DOJ - "So Sorry, but When it Comes to Sherman Act
Section 2 Conduct, We Can't Agree on What the Law Is, or What it Should
Be", http://www.masslawblog.com/2oo8/i i/the-ftc-and-doj-so-sorry-but-whenit-comes-to-sherman-action-section-2 -conduct-we-cant-agree-on-what-thelaw-is-or-what-it-should-be/ (Nov. 4, 2008, 6:42 EST) [hereinafter "So Sorry
...

1].

41 Spencer

Weber Waller, Hearing But Not Listening: Comparative
Competition Law and the DOJ Monopoly Report, GLOBAL COMPETITION
POLICY, Oct. 2oo8, at i, http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org.
46

Id. at 2-3.

41 DOJ, EC Antitrust Chiefs Provide Diverse Views on Unilateral Conduct

by Dominant
Firms, http://traderegulation.blogspot.com/2oo8/ioldoj-ecantitrust-chiefs-provide-diverse.html (Oct. i, 2008, 11:47 EST).
48 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GUIDANCE ON THE
COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN APPLYING ARTICLE 82 EC
TREATY
TO
ABUSIVE
EXCLUSIONARY
CONDUCT
BY
DOMINANT

UNDERTAKINGS (Dec. 3, 2oo8), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf.
49 Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, Frequently
Asked Questions (Dec. 3, 2o08), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
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approach embedded in the Guidance Paper is a step towards
more convergence with ... some other jurisdictions, such as the
U.S.," it also notes that the DOJ's report "differs from the Article
82 Guidance Paper on a number of issues - such as the way to
balance the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a conduct, the
role of market shares in assessing dominance and the assessment
of pricing conduct." 50
In a world where global business means firms are subject
to the laws of many jurisdictions, it is observed that the
competition law of the European Commission, not the United
States, increasingly serves as the model for nations around the
world to develop their own competition laws."' Critics feel the
DOJ's report does global firms no favor by foregoing an
important opportunity to reach consensus and establish some
degree of uniformity5 2in the law by instead clinging to its own
"highly lenient rules.
INFLUENTIAL OR INCONSEQUENTIAL?

It must be remembered that the DOJ's report amounts to
no more than policy guidance.53 Though critics claim the report
reads like "an attempt to lock in future administrations to a
similar course, 5 4 it is also believed it will likely have a "short
shelf life."55 As the deregulatory zeitgeist of the past eight years
falls away and the country learns that unfettered markets are not
always self-correcting, government regulation may again play a
crucial role in protecting competition. 6 This could mean that the
DOJ's report will "soon become a footnote in American antitrust
jurisprudence."5 7
In fact, shortly after the report was released, Barack
Obama's campaign told reporters that "the Justice Department's
position reflected the need for a more aggressive approach to
ReleasesAction.do ?reference=MEMO/o8/7 6 1&format= HTML&aged= o&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en.
50 Id.

"' Waller, supra note 45, at 3.
52 Id.

13

Eric Lichtblau, Antitrust report exposes rift between U.D. agencies,

INTERNATIONAL

HERALD

TRIBUNE,

Sep.

9,

2oo8,

http://www.iht.com/articles/2oo8/o9/o9/business/antitrust.php.
14 Waller, supra note 45, at i.
15Id. at 5.
56 Thumb on the Scales, supra note 29.
5 "So Sorry

... ",

supra note 44.

available

at
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antitrust enforcement in the next administration.""8
Jason
Furman, economic policy director for the campaign, said "[f]our
more years of the Bush-McCain approach to antitrust will only
lead to higher prices for American consumers and a less
competitive environment for smaller businesses to thrive."59
Even though the report is not law, judges and litigators
might still look to it for guidance, especially because one of its
primary goals has been to establish standards that are, if nothing
else, easy to apply. 0 Some have speculated that the report "may
lie dormant during a Democratic administration, only to be
revived at some unknown future date... when its approach to
antitrust enforcement returns to favor. "61
For now, it is
anticipated that the FTC and some of the more aggressive state
antitrust enforcers will move forward "to fill any Sherman Act
enforcement void that might
be created" by the DOJ's narrowing
62
of Section 2 enforcement.

"Lichtblau, supra note 53.
59 Id.
60 Whoriskey,

supra note 34.
"So Sorry ... ", supra note 44.
62 Don Allen Resnikoff, Section 2 Enforcement: A State-Enforcement View
of the DOJ Section 2 Report, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2008, at i,
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/o8/io/Octo8-Resnikoff
IO-24f.pdf (citing Statement of FTC Commissioners, supra note 2, at ii).
61

